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Can factor market competition, given pertinent incentives, bring
about eﬃciency gains, or is privatisation necessary? We assess the im-
pact of factor market competition on Chinese state-owned enterprises’
productivity in a laboratory-like setting. The empirical evidence sug-
gests that substantial eﬃciency gains are achievable pre-privatisation.
Methodologically, we adapt an algorithm developed by (Olley and
Pakes 1996) which deals with simultaneity and selection bias in pro-
duction function estimation. This is required since the reform process
that introduced factor market competition involved endogenous group
selection. While macro-level timing was important, enterprise charac-
teristics, chieﬂy capital intensity and productivity, played an important
role in the sequencing of reforms. Further, reform-induced competitive
pressures brought about signiﬁcant eﬃciency gains prior to privatisa-
tion. Finally, not controlling for selection bias would have resulted in
an overestimation of reform-related productivity gains by up to ﬁfty
percent.
Keywords: Endogenous Group Selection, Simultaneity, Production Func-
tions, Productivity Dynamics, Institutional Change, Chinese Industrial State-
Owned Enterprises.1 Introduction
Underlying China’s extraordinary economic growth process in recent decades
is an ideological and practical eclecticism that has allowed free-market cap-
italism to coexist with, and ﬁnally eclipse, the erstwhile dominant central
plan. Similarly, the privately owned sector has outgrown the state sector,
which is not only shrinking in relative importance, but since the mid-1990s
has been undergoing a limited privatisation process. Still, the stability of
the once dominant state-owned sector remains crucial, in terms of employ-
ment, economic activity, and debt levels, to the economy as a whole. The
intention to move away from a planned system to a market based one was
announced at the end of the 1970s. However, no clear statements about
how to proceed with this were made. Still, whichever sector of the economy
we focus on, it appears that reforms, and their sequencing, were chosen in
a deliberately eclectic and opportunist fashion, in an attempt to maintain
social stability while allowing for explosive economic growth.
This paper focuses on the eﬀect of introducing factor market competition
to Chinese state-owned enterprises pre-privatisation, essentially the penul-
timate chapter in this move from plan to market, from state- to private-
enterprise dominated economy. From an economic point of view, the debate
whether the beneﬁts of competition can be reaped prior to privatisation is
of ongoing interest. Here we have a laboratory-type set-up which allows us
to evaluate the impact of competitive forces, introduced in a heterogeneous
fashion, pre-privatisation. While we provide a detailed view of a complex re-
form process itself, our method for evaluating its eﬀects is considerably more
sophisticated than any employed in the analysis of institutional change so
far. The methodology employed and the results oﬀer a fundamental insight
to the assessment of the reform process as a whole.
Thus, we provide both a methodological and an empirical contribution.
Empirically, we describe a reform process that introduces competition to
factor markets and evaluate its eﬀect on SOE performance. This process
involves the devolution of decision-making power over factor markets from
a central authority to the managerial level, where the timing diﬀers from
3enterprise to enterprise. We show that this process followed a strategic path,
in the sense that it was tentative and experimental to begin with, but then
evolved into a more general push by the late 1980s. Along this path, enter-
prise characteristics, in particular capital intensity and productivity, were
important determinants of the timing. Further, we generate and analyse
dynamic, ﬁrm-level production function parameters and productivity esti-
mates for Chinese SOEs between 1980 and 1994 in the industrial sector of
the economy while controlling for simultaneity and selection bias. The sam-
ple is comprised of 680 SOEs that operate in forty two-digit sectors of the
industrial sector of the economy. On the methodological front we adapt
an algorithm originally outlined in (Olley and Pakes 1996) such that we can
control for endogenous group selection when comparing estimates of produc-
tion functions. The problem arises here because of the way capital intensity
and productivity aﬀect into the sequencing process.1 Thus, this method-
ology deals with a complex reform process and sheds light on the driving
forces behind it and the eﬀects it produces. Further potential application
of this methodology could be the testing of learning-by-doing versus inher-
ent characteristics hypotheses in the trade literature, state versus private
ownership problems, or domestic versus foreign outsourcing of intermediate
inputs.2
As for the eﬀect of reforms, enterprises that are reformed are more cap-
ital intensive and productive than the unreformed. The diﬀerence in our
estimates becomes starker once we allow for diﬀerences in technology, the
relationship between investment and productivity, or control for selection
bias between those that have asset control and those that do not. Hence
we conclude that the reform process is linked to productivity in a way that
suggests the causality runs in both directions: Enterprises with control over
1See (Olley and Pakes 1996) for an analogous argument relating to enterprise survival.
2See (De Loeker 2004), on exporting versus non-exporting status, (Amiti and
Konings 2005) for status of imports in terms of ﬁnal versus intermediate goods. Also,
(Feenstra, Markusen, and Zeile 1992) and (Kasahara and Rodrigue 2004) consider the ef-
fect of imported versus indigenous input status on productivity, though TFP is estimated
without controlling for endogenous selection to a status. In a second step TFP is linked
to a particular status.
4assets were better to begin with, and improved their performance once they
reformed. Finally, these results hold pre-privatisation. This is important, as
it shows that incomplete reforms in terms of changing the economic struc-
ture from plan to market can be eﬀective on the margin so long as incentives
are aligned.3
Since the core question under consideration here is whether devolution
of control over enterprise assets from the centre to the managerial level had
a positive impact on Chinese SOE performance, we proceed as follows: In
Section 2 we discuss institutional features regarding China and its reform
process, in order to understand the process we are modeling. Speciﬁcally,
we know for each enterprise the year during which control over production
factor was devolved from the centre to the managerial level.4 The data were
assembled from four datasets, which were compiled by the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences in collaboration with the universities of Oxford and Cali-
fornia, San Diego.5
Section 3 introduces the estimator of choice. Since we will evaluate per-
formance in terms of productivity, we require an estimator that will generate
production function parameter and dynamic productivity estimates that are
consistent. Weighing up the pros and cons of various estimators, we arrived
at the conclusion that an adapted version of an algorithm developed by
(Olley and Pakes 1996) would be the preferred estimator for the problem
at hand, since it crucially deals with simultaneity and selection bias. We
discuss this facet in more detail below.
3N.B.: Essentially, grassroots and top-down selection are observationally equivalent
since we cannot distinguish one form the other. The assumption is that, either, more
productive ﬁrms are selected by the political centre for a particular reform based on
their observable characteristics, i.e. technology. We consider productivity is more readily
observed by the manager and so he may push for reform, as he can gauge the potential
beneﬁts and risks associated. This particular view is a matter of interpretation, but the
fact that productivity and technology are driving forces in the reform process, and that
reforms improve productivity remains.
4This control over factor markets is given by the manager’s right to hire and ﬁre
workers, and the right to invest or sell-oﬀ enterprise assets.
5(Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton 1994), (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and
Naughton 1995) and (Li 1997) have used the same data covering the 1980-89 period,
while (Li and Wu 2002) also extend the data to 1994.
5As the discussion of our results in Section 4 suggests, reform pre-privatisation
can be successful. Hence, we make a contribution to the ownership-versus-
control debate, which attempts to tackle the question as to whether signiﬁ-
cant performance gains through competitive pressures are possible by oper-
ational reform only, or whether private ownership is essential for this. Most
western studies that have failed to ﬁnd eﬃciency gains from privatisation
argue that SOEs tend to operate with competitive pressures in factor and
product markets pre-privatisation, and hence the contributions of privatisa-
tion are hard to isolate.6 We note here, that apart from initial conditions,
labour market can prove crucial since reforms in this area can shift bargain-
ing power to the manager, thus containing SOE-employee demands.7 Given
the correct incentives , managers can thus eﬀectivly employ their autonomy
over factors to improve productivity pre-prvatisation. A crucial feature of
our set-up is that managerial autonomy over factor markets is introduced at
diﬀerent times to diﬀerent enterprises, which all remain in state-ownership.
Essentially, we thus have laboratory type set-up, where we can test for the
eﬀect of the introduction of factor market competition prior to privatisa-
tion, while controlling for the fact that reform might be brought about by
productivity. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 5.
2 Reform of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises
Along the road from planned to market driven economy the Chinese Gov-
ernment introduced a plethora of economy-wide as well as sector- or region-
speciﬁc reforms, which allowed market economy institutions to take root
and incentives to spur economic activity. In our analysis we focus on a par-
ticular set of factor market reforms that were undertaken in Chinese SOEs
from the mid-eighties onward. Essentially, this is the penultimate step in
a reform process that began between 1978 and 1983 and culminated in the
large-scale privatisation that took place from the mid-nineties onward. In
particular, we focus on the introduction of managerial autonomy over deci-
6See (Walsh and Whelan 2001) for an overview.
7See (McGoldrick 2005).
6sions regarding investment and control over assets and, to a lesser extent,
hiring and ﬁring of workers.8
This section addresses two important issues. First, this subset of reforms
should be set in context of a larger process, paying particular attention to
the underlying driving forces. Second, the SOE reform process is by its very
nature subject to endogeneity, i.e. driven by enterprise characteristics. We
brieﬂy discuss the main reform strategies that appeared around this time
in the literature, Big-Bang vs. Gradualism, referring the avid reader to the
literature for a more complete picture. Against this backdrop, we sketch
the economic development and important reforms of the Chinese economy
in broad-brush strokes since the beginning of reforms. Our focus, however,
is the reform path of Chinese SOEs, which sees these entities follow diﬀer-
ent paths on their way from planned economy toward privatisation. Thus,
we refer to previous important work regarding the reform of Chinese SOEs,
and factor markets in particular. The second point we want to make is that,
due to the philosophy underlying the general process, idiosyncracies appear
naturally. Chieﬂy, the path itself is likely to be diﬀerent for each reforming
unit, often depending on other factors, such as ﬁrm characteristics, notably
linked to factors of production and productivity. This feature of the reform
process can lead to problems with endogeneity when attempting to assess
the eﬀect of a reform. Hence this second point underpins our methodology,
which attempts to deal with endogeneity of exactly that type.
While the former Soviet Union largely followed the policies of the Wash-
ington Consensus, put forward by institutions such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, China only paid limited attention to it.
For example the Chinese respected macroeconomic stability but resisted de-
mands for wide-scale privatisation and liberalisation. Instead, they took an
approach to reform that has been termed Gradualism.9 Thus, a very dif-
8Enterprises that are capital market reformed enterprise have autonomy over decisions
regarding the buying and selling of enterprise assets, short- and long-run investment de-
cisions, and buying and selling on international markets.
9It has been purported that the Big-Bang approach has the beneﬁt of incurring a
once-oﬀ negative shock to economic activity which is more than compensated for by the
relatively swift rebound in activity. This sees the idle resources employed in a more
7ferent philosophy underlies the reform strategy under a Gradualist regime
when compared to one that implements blanket policies indiscriminately.
Namely, rather than following some rigid, pre-planned path, one can take
an experimental approach, regionally as well as regarding the sector or unit.
Thus, one gains experience regarding the eﬀects of diﬀerent reforms in diﬀer-
ent settings, while not aﬀecting the economy as a whole. This policy doctrin
of looking for the easiest reform strategy by slowly feeling one’s way forward
has been termed crossing the river by groping stones. Further, the sequenc-
ing of reforms is an important factor. In a Gradualist framework, one can
initiate the least costly reforms ﬁrst, essentially building constituencies in
favour of further reform, while, in theory, compensating those that lose out.
It should be noted that a potential major problem with Gradualism is the
possibility of getting stuck in a half-way house, a state in which the initial
gainers prefer to stay in the current situation rather than press on. The inef-
ﬁciency inherent in such a situation of incompatible yet co-existing systems
is self-evident and may even allow for certain agents to gain from arbitrage
across both systems, for example in the case where goods are traded at mar-
ket and planned prices. 10
A particular facet of sequencing could then be summarised by the notion
of necessary, e.g. prices, vs. suﬃcient reforms, e.g. managerial autonomy.
Many reforms that went before the reform of factor markets, and eventually
privatisation, may be thought of as preparatory, such as price liberalisation,
devolution of operational control and ownership from the centre to the mu-
nicipality, or the granting to managers of autonomy over output decisions.
productive fashion than they would have been if the institutions using them had been
bank-rolled or kept in existence even if they were no longer logically compatible with the
new order. This Schumpetarian view has been challenged by the observation that the
initial drop in activity is likely to have cataclysmic eﬀects if it is too large and prolonged
for the system to absorb, thus resulting in wide-spread unemployment of resources rather
than simply ineﬃciency. Thus, a Big-Bang approach, that removes all aspects of planning
without the institutions of a market economy in place, could result in a period of dis-
organisation, which could in turn result in an initial massive fall in output as witnessed in
the former Soviet Union, see (Repkine and Walsh 1999) and (Konings and Walsh 1999).
Furthermore, social capital such as organisational, institutional and procedural knowledge
may be terminally lost under such circumstances, see (Stiglitz 2000).
10See (Dewatripont and Roland 1995) for a discussion on this.
8Similarly, marginal reform, such as the introduction of ﬂexible wages in
the form of ’performance’ related bonuses or limited ﬁxed-term employment
contracts, is preparatory.11 As for factor market liberalisation, we note the
following features. First, there is a wide-spread push for factor market liber-
alisation in the late eighties and early nineties, suggesting a top-down policy.
Second, prior to this big push, there is a tentative experimental phase. It is
worth noting that there appears to be deliberate selection underlying these
processes. Labour market autonomy is more likely to be achieved in enter-
prises that have larger labour forces and smaller capital stock. On the other
hand, managers of enterprises that have a smaller capital stock, while more
capital intensive, and larger value added are more likely to achieve capital
market autonomy. It is this feature that could bring about selection bias
when examining the eﬀects of reform. While much debate has focused on
bottom-up vs. top-down hypothesis about how reforms are brought about,
it appears causality moves in both direction. We deal with this particular
problem in our estimation procedure.12 As outlined in Section III our esti-
mation procedure deals with these issues in a unique way.
In 1978 the Chinese tentatively sought for a way to avoid this problem,
where the ”government’s role often has been to permit change rather than
to initiate it”.13 The planned economy was upheld, while ﬁrms bought and
sold goods in the market, at market prices, if they were in excess of quo-
11Certain reforms, such as the selling of above-plan quota produce and proﬁt retention
were quickly taken up by all sectors in the economy. Indeed, the liberalisation of prices was
brought about in this fashion. In other cases, some sectors were quicker to liberalise than
others. Sequencing and necessary vs. suﬃcient reforms: If one believes in the beneﬁts of
sequencing reforms, one may hold the view that reforms undertaken early on are largely
preparatory in nature, providing the necessary institutions and infrastructure for more
costly and risky reforms to take proper eﬀect. The beneﬁts of introducing these reforms
at the margin are likely to be in the form of education as well as institutional development
and ﬂexibility, while preserving the old structures for the time being. However, it seems
plausible that a manager without the autonomy to hire and ﬁre, i.e. without the stick of
threatening to replace a worker, is likely not to be able to strictly link bonus payments
to performance, i.e. eﬃciently employ the carrot. This would see rent-sharing as obser-
vationally equivalent with eﬃciency wages. Thus, the introduction managerial hiring and
ﬁring should see a fall in wages, as pointed out in (McGoldrick 2005).
12See the Probit regressions of company characteristics on reform status reported in
Table 7 in particular.
13See (McMillan and Naughton 1994).
9tas regulations. While initial reforms in industry were deemed unsuccessful,
with some retrenchment by 1983, there was a strong push for reforms again
after 1983.14 Thus, we witness the birth of the Dual-Track system, which
allows both planned and market prices to coexist for goods produced to
quotas and excess goods respectively.
”Beginning in 1978 [], China reformed its industrial sector. Enterprises
that had been largely controlled by the state were given some market or
market-like incentives. [] State owned enterprises were allowed to keep some
fraction of their proﬁts, where before all proﬁts had to be remitted to the
state. Enterprises began to sell some of their outputs and buy some of their
inputs in free markets, rather than selling and procuring everything at state-
controlled prices”.15
In 1978 SOE’s accounted for 78 percent of industrial output and 19 per-
cent of total employment.16 The degree of state produced output sold at
market prices rose steadily, and averaged 38 percent of state-owned enter-
prises’ output by 1989, and, in particular cases, even amounted to all output.
By the same time on average 56 percent of inputs to state production was
procured at market prices.17 By the latter half of the 1980s nearly all SOEs
in our sample had completed this type of reform, thus having obtained the
right to determine output value, pay bonuses, retain excess proﬁts, and pro-
duce and sell at market prices. Also, the level of control was devolved from
the state or provincial level, to the municipal level. We view these reforms
as initial steps toward creating a market economy environment. The eﬀect
of these reforms by themselves is overviewed in (Li and Wu 2002), who con-
clude that their eﬀect was indeed limited. (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and
Naughton 1994) take a more benevolent view of initial reforms, but their
results fail to establish a strong link from the reform process to productivity
enhancement.
Thus, the main function of initial reforms appears to have been the
14See (Naughton 1995).
15(Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton 1994). See also (Byrd 1991), (Naughton
1995) and, (Qian 2000)
16(Kennedy and Marquis 1998)
17(McMillan and Naughton 1994)
10creation of the institutions necessary for a further stage of reforms to be
successful. A standstill at this point would be counterproductive, as some
agents had incentives to make use of the status quo of this halfway house
by trading between the co-existing parts of the economy. This reportedly
led to a rise in social tension in the late 1980s.18 It is at this point that the
authorities began to appreciate the necessity to advance further reforms,
but still they lacked a clear goal or path, which is summed up in the slogan
emphcrossing the river by touching stones.
“[U]ncertainty over its vision of the future and aversion to risk help
explain China’s initial groping reform strategy. and success has sustained
the continuity of a gradual evolutionary approach to reform.”(Jeﬀerson and
Singh 1999)
It was appreciated that the growth in the private sector could not be
matched by the state-sector. One can say with respect to this phenomenon
that, rather than destroying the old institutions and starting from scratch,
China let its new economy grow around what already existed, i.e. was
“[g]rowing out of the Plan”.19
Further reforms were initiated. Figure 1 and Figure 2 as well as Table
1 show how the take-up of reforms involving the devolution of control over
enterprise factors from the centre to the enterprise level evolved over time
in our sample. We plot the percentage take-up over time of what we term
capital and labour autonomy reforms.20 While the reform process began in
the late 1970s, it is only from the mid-1980s onwards that we see autonomy
over enterprise factors of production being introduced. However, the vast
majority of the sample is engaged in these latter-stage reforms by the early
1990s. Regarding the causality of reforms, there is evidence in the literature
for two-way causality.
”Virtually all of the literature on the enterprise reform examines the
18See (Laﬀont and Qian 1999), (Dewatripont and Roland 1995) and (Fang 1994).
19(Naughton 1995)
20A labour market reformed enterprises has managerial autonomy over hiring and ﬁring
of employees, while an enterprise that is capital market reformed has managerial autonomy
over decisions regarding either the right to buy and sell enterprise assets, make short- or
long-term investment, or to buy and sell on international markets.
11impact of reform on performance. Causality also operated strongly in the
other direction. [...] Indeed, the industrial innovation ladder predicts that
causality should run from enterprise to reform”. (Jeﬀerson and Singh 1999)
The dataset provides information on various types of reform undertaken
by enterprises by year. While the period around 1990 is signiﬁed by several
years of a strong push toward reform, there is some heterogeneity regarding
the timing, with some enterprises taking up reform measures much earlier,
and some never having reformed during our sample period. As for the take-
up of asset control reform across industries and regions, we note that it
has been a very homogenous process. By 1989 no more than 30% of en-
terprises had gained managerial control over assets in any of the industries
or provinces, with the notable exception of one province which had 33%,
and generally this ﬁgure was signiﬁcantly lower. However, by 1992 at least
60% of all enterprises, irrespective of category, had gained said autonomy,
but, again, considerably more for the bulk of industries. Thus, the reform,
at large, did not target particular industries or locations, but was a broad
measure, which, as our methodology reveals, was undertaken by observable
and unobservable company characteristics.
As can be seen from Table 1, the reform process as a whole was very
tentative until 1987. It appears that in the initial period from 1987 on those
with labour, asset, or both reforms grew explosively in numbers. However,
the labour reform only group slowly fell from a high of 64 enterprises in
1989 to a mere 20 in 1993. It also seems apparent that those that received
labour market reforms alone were less likely to gain asset market reform,
than vice-versa. On the other hand, those that gained asset market reform
status were likely to gain control over hiring and ﬁring. Eventually, more
than two-thirds of the sample had managerial autonomy in both markets,
with nearly a quarter having undergone asset market reform. Only less than
ten percent remained unreformed, and a small minority of twenty had only
achieved labour market reform. These statistics suggest that the reform
process was intended to involve as many enterprises as possible, and it was
to be as complete as possible. Still, the implementation was eclectic in the
sense that the timing was chosen on a ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm basis, with a diﬀerent
12package (i.e. labour only, asset only, or both) envisioned for each enterprise.
We will provide evidence that this selection process was determined by un-
observable and observable enterprise characteristics in what follows.
The summary statistics in Table 2 indicate that enterprises in the capi-
tal market reformed group are generally larger. However, one can see from
Table 3 that this is only due to the fact that enterprises grew signiﬁcantly in
all reported categories, other than labour, over time. Since the bulk of re-
formed enterprises are in the latter part of the period, what actually emerges
from Tables 3 is that there is a general tendency for smaller enterprises to be
selected to the group of capital reformers until 1993, by when eighty percent
of ﬁrms are capital market reformed. Similar ﬁndings hold for the labour
market reformers.
(Naughton 1995) supports a bottom-up view when he states that the
ex-post apparent consistency of the reform process came about only be-
cause reforms were introduced in an experimental fashion, where failures
were disguised in the mass or by retrenchment. The information gathered
in these initial, localised experiments were then reapplied to most SOEs
in the mid-1980s, thus reducing the cost of implementation due to trial
and error.21 The empirical evidence presented here regarding the reform
process suggests that reforms were initially introduced tentatively, in a low-
risk, experimental fashion. Contrary to expectations, as more SOEs were
involved, the selection criteria underlying this process appear not to have
been dominated by industry or regional considerations. Rather, observable
and unobservable ﬁrm characteristics appear decisive in this regard. Table
7 provides estimates of coeﬃcients of a probit model that explains reforms
status, the dependent variable, with various enterprise attributes. In the
case of capital market reform, in regression (9), productivity22 is a signiﬁ-
cant positive factor in determining the likelihood of reform, while it has no
eﬀect on the probability of labour market reform, see regression (10). On the
other hand, regarding the likelihood of labour market reform, the size of the
21See (McMillan and Naughton 1992) and (Qian 2000)
22The productivity estimate used in this regression is generated in regression (6) in
Table 4.
13capital stock has a negative impact on the likelihood of managers’ gaining
autonomy over assets. The size of the labour force has a positive eﬀect on
the probability of labour market reform, while there is no discernable im-
pact on the likelihood of capital market reform. Finally, the time-trend and
managerial output autonomy are positive and signiﬁcant factors in the prob-
ability of both reforms. This last observation is consistent with a hypothesis
that reforms involved both central planning, there exists a clear time-line
and sequencing is important. The fact that a smaller capital stock is asso-
ciated with a lower likelihood of reform is consistent with an experimental
nature of reforms. Namely, the potential loss if things go badly is lower
than for enterprises with a large capital stock. Importantly, the deployment
of each reform appears to be asymmetric otherwise, since productivity is a
driving force for capital market reform, while the size of the labour force
for labour market reform. Thus, grassroots pressures appear important for
capital market reforms. On the other hand, introducing managerial auton-
omy over hiring and ﬁring in ﬁrms with large labour forces indicates that
this is employed as a disciplining device.
Furthermore, as we shall see in the next section, enterprises that engaged
in capital market competition display higher capital intensity and produc-
tivity levels and better investment behaviour, especially once we correct for
selection bias, which indicates that the devolution of control over assets was
successful. Regression (10) in Table 7 indicates labour market reform is also
less likely for enterprises with large capital stock and more likely for those
with larger levels of employment. Also, as we will see in the following sec-
tion, ﬁrms that engage in labour market reform without gaining control over
assets have signiﬁcantly lower productivity levels, and have larger employ-
ments levels. For those that engage in both reforms, the labour reform is
neutral in eﬀect. We believe grassroots pressure to be relevant to selection
to reform status because such micro-considerations, such as productivity are
relevant. If capital market reform is costly, then one will only choose it if
one believes the potential gains outweigh the risks, which is more likely for
productive enterprises. (McGoldrick 2005) shows that enterprises that in-
troduce hiring-and-ﬁring manage to reduce ﬂexible wages signiﬁcantly.This,
14in conjunction with the labour intensity of the labour market reformers, sug-
gests the reform actually altered the bargaining relationship in favour of the
manager.23 Thus, competitive pressures as much as Central Party schemes
appear crucial to the process.
With respect to SOEs, prior to 1992 they were not privatised. Over
the coming years there was a marked increase in levels of privatisation.
Small SOEs were privatised at the county level and layoﬀs emerged at the
city-level. This form of holding on to large enterprises was promoted by
the slogan ”grasping the large and letting go of the small”. Small- and
medium-sized enterprises made up 95 percent of SOEs in 1993, and in many
provinces about half of these were privatised by 1996. At this stage some
ten million workers had been laid oﬀ from SOEs, and a further 11.5 million
in 1997. This appears typical of China’s initially slow pace of reform, which
then accelerates. Large-scale layoﬀs were never a feature in modern China
prior to this. This analysis does not evaluate the beneﬁt of privatisation
after 1994. However, it does attempt to estimate the impact of compet-
itive pressure coming from factor market liberalisation on productivity at
the enterprise level under state ownership. (Li 2003), using data from 1998,
models the selection of enterprises to private ownership and ﬁnds the same
decentralised nature of the reform process. The enterprises that faced the
most competitive pressure and hardest budget constraints were the ﬁrst to
select to privatization.
An important question regarding the set of reforms we look at in this
paper and the methodology we apply in order to evaluate them is whether
managers would have an interest in making use of any additional freedom
gained from the reform process. Apart from being able to retain proﬁts, as
mentioned above, a personal incentive was also provided. Namely, during
the sample period enterprises were signed up to the ”contract responsibility
system”. The contract had proﬁt and tax targets to be paid to the gov-
23In a related paper that looks at the eﬀects of hiring and ﬁring by themselves
(McGoldrick 2005) shows that hiring and ﬁring did not bring about improvements in
TFP. Rather, it appears to have changed the bargaining power of management vis--vis
workers in a way that improved labour’s productivity while being associated with a clear-
cut reduction of bonuses, which were often abused, for any level of productivity.
15ernment and, failing this, managers would forgo a bond posted prior to the
contract. In return, managers and workers would be paid agreed bonuses.
They also had the right to divert retained proﬁts to a welfare and investment
fund.
3 The Behavioural Model and Estimation Proce-
dure
In this section we outline and motivate our choice of estimator. As indicated
in the introduction, an attempt at answering the speciﬁc problem must meet
certain requirements. Since we are looking to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of
the devolution of control over factors of production to the managerial level
in Chinese SOEs pre-privatisation, we need to be able to evaluate how per-
formance was aﬀected by reform. In order to achieve this, we require a
performance measure that we expect to respond to the reform, productivity.
Production function estimation has well known caveats, in particular prob-
lems relating the simultaneity and selection bias. As the timing of reform
take-up varies by enterprise we require productivity estimates at the enter-
prise level. Further, these estimates must be dynamic. This is essential so
that we can make an attempt at identifying whether reforms had an eﬀect
on productivity. Also, since it is likely capital stock and productivity are
linked to capital market reform, and the results in the next section strongly
suggest this, we face a selection problem. In what follows we motivate our
choice of the OP estimator for analising the problem at hand. There exist a
number of estimators that fulﬁl many of requirements outlined above. Nat-
urally, a choice for any of them over the remainder can easily be criticised,
as each is likely to be imperfect when attempting to model the situation.
First, we highlight the weaknesses of some alternative estimators for the
current problem, notably OLS, GLS within group, and system GMM. We
then introduce the OP estimator and show how we adapt it to the problem
at hand.
16To begin with, we brieﬂy discuss some alternative estimators. The nat-
ural starting point of regression analysis is OLS, with its well-documented
limitations. While OLS allows for dynamic estimates of ﬁrm-level produc-
tivity, these estimates are thought to be subject to simultaneity bias.24 Like-
wise, as regards selection bias, OLS provides no way of distinguishing the
causality for diﬀerences in productivity. We may be able to estimate diﬀer-
ences across groups, but we cannot identify the reason for these diﬀerences.
An attempt at capturing a common eﬀect due to reform is achieved by in-
troducing a dummy variable for reform.
Alternatively, a GLS within group estimator, as set out by (Mundlak
1963), attempts to deal with simultaneity. However, this approach does not
allow for ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerences to vary over time.25. This would be par-
ticularly detrimental if a structural break existed. We provide GLS within
estimator estimates in the following section. Also, for production functions
this estimator notoriously understates the capital coeﬃcient. This is thought
to be due to the relatively static nature of capital stock in large ﬁrms when
compared to their labour stock, while the diﬀerence between enterprise cap-
ital stocks can be quite large.26
Finally, we considered a system GMM estimator, such as (Blundell,
Bond, and Windmeijer 2000). Simultaneity bias is addressed by modelling
the unobservable as a dynamic error component model with the use of non-
linear moment restrictions for identiﬁcation. The extension of this approach
to address the problem of an endogenous reform dummy is not straightfor-
ward. Hence, while this approach provides a solution to the simultaneity
issue, it is diﬃcult to see how it can readily be adapted to the issue of se-
lection bias, which is our reason for rejecting it.
The advantage of the OP estimator is that it explicitly attempts to deal
with simultaneity and selection bias related to production function estima-
tion using a behavioural model of the unobservable that is applicable in the
present scenario. The central assumption of (Olley and Pakes 1996) is that
24See (Marschak and Andrews 1944).
25See (Grilliches and Mairesse 1995).
26See (Grilliches and Mairesse 1995).
17managerial behaviour can be modelled such that their decisions regarding
investment consistently provide information regarding productivity. Essen-
tially, managers take their state variables, productivity and capital, and their
environment, competitors and prices, as a given and then make decisions re-
garding their choice variables, investment and labour, that are consistent
with maximisation of ﬁrm value. The relationship among investment and
productivity is assumed to be positive and monotonic, i.e. managers invest
more if they perceive a higher productivity draw, ceteris paribus. Impor-
tantly, the structural model of the unobservable does not dictate the speciﬁc
functional form, i.e. the OP estimator is non-parametric in capital and in-
vestment. Thus, productivity can be backed-out of the production function
by inverting the investment equation, which is a function of the state vari-
ables, so long as investment is positive. In their paper, investment dynamics
are said to follow a Markov process.
In the case of simultaneity, it is assumed that the only variable unob-
served by the econometrician, but feeding through to the manager’s choice
of inputs, is productivity.27 As for selection bias, certain assumptions about
the distribution of ﬁrm productivity, conditional on state variables, are
made. Speciﬁcally, it is assumed that, given the remaining state variables,
notably capital, there exists a threshold level of productivity, realisations be-
low which induce the ﬁrm to exit from the market. (Olley and Pakes 1996)
assume that the threshold level of productivity is decreasing in capital, while
proﬁtability is increasing in capital for any level of productivity. Hence, more
capital intensive enterprises can expect to make higher levels of proﬁt in the
future for any given level of productivity. This should lead to a negative
bias on the capital coeﬃcient for companies that remain active.
In order to apply the OP estimator to our treatment of the problem two
central assumptions mirroring (Olley and Pakes 1996) are required: First,
there exists a weakly positive relationship between investment and produc-
27See (Grilliches and Mairesse 1995) for a summary of the problem and relevant criticism
of (Olley and Pakes 1996). In particular the assumption that productivity is the only
unobservable aﬀecting investment decisions.
18tivity.28 We assume this holds whether control over enterprise assets has
been devolved to the managerial level or remains centralised, usually at the
level of the municipality.29 Second, we assume that a ﬁrm will undertake
asset market reform once its productivity exceeds some threshold level and
that this threshold level is increasing in the capital stock. This feature
would induce selection bias in a way that corresponds to the (Olley and
Pakes 1996) entry rule. The idea is to control for survivor bias in a way
that assumes ﬁrms enter into the reformed pool only if a certain threshold
level of productivity is achieved, given the remaining state variables. By do-
ing this we can correct the reformed group for the assumed underlying bias
in the estimates of production function parameters, and hence productivity.
In the discussion of our results in the next section, evidence supporting this
selection related bias is discussed. We provide the results of two forms of the
OP estimator, a two- and a three-step version. In the two-step version we
simply correct for simultaneity, thus ignoring selection issues, i.e. we treat
reform as an exogenous process. In the three-step approach we then tackle
selection as an endogenous process.
The methodology aside, some serious questions remain regarding our
empirical analysis. Is such a behavioural model appropriate for the current
problem of reform regarding asset control in Chinese SOEs? Two objections
must be dealt with. First, did investment follow productivity in China, pre-
and post-liberalisation? Second, did a consistent process exist in Chinese
SOEs that saw higher productivity enterprises more likely to be reformed?
Our response to these objections is as follows. Even though (Olley and
Pakes 1996) motivate their structural model of the unobservable with a
theoretical contribution by (Ericson and Pakes 1995), which assumes the
existence of Markov perfect Nash equilibrium in investment over time, the
econometric technique is operational when investment sequences and adop-
28In principle, this is suﬃcient for the OP-estimator to be consistent. We develop this
argument below.
29N.B.: Not having devolved control over assets to the manager does not imply no
investment takes place. It simply implies the observation of productivity and the invest-
ment decisions are made at a greater distance, where distance may be taken to refer to
an information chain, for example.
19tion of reform are weakly rational, driven in some part by observable and
unobservable state variables. In other words, the technique does not re-
quire investment dynamics and adoption of reform in Chinese SOEs to be
optimal, but they have to be weakly related to economic factors such as en-
terprise level productivity. We argue that this is the case and provide strong
evidence in the previous and the following sections of the paper that enter-
prises are selected to reform based on observable as well as unobservable
characteristics. In this context we also refer to the contract responsibility
system, outlined in the previous section, which was operational in the vast
bulk of the enterprises we analyse. Even though incentive problems were
not solved, managers had an interest in achieving performance goals, such
as proﬁtability and output growth. Also, planners would target investment
at enterprises where proﬁt and taxes were channeled back to Government.
Thus, investment dynamics and adoption of reform should be driven in
some part by the unobservable productivity type. Essentially, we assume
that undertaking reform is costly, and the cost is decreasing in produc-
tivity.30 Hence, we can use (Olley and Pakes 1996) selection rules and
enterprise-level investment dynamics to control for the omitted unobserv-
able, i.e. productivity, using semi-parametric techniques in our estimation
of production functions. By this reasoning, we should be able to back out
a productivity index from the residual in the production function for each
enterprise.
As outlined above, two types of reform are mentioned, namely the de-
volution of control to the managerial level of control over enterprise assets
and hiring and ﬁring of enterprise workers. To begin with, we use dummy
variables to capture each. They take a value of unity if the reform has taken
place, and zero otherwise. However, our main focus is on the asset control
reform, which we refer to with arit. The labour market reform is denoted as
lrit and its interaction with labour is denoted llrit, which allows for intercept
shifts and variation in the output elasticity of labour due to labour market
30Alternatively, future expected gains are increasing in productivity, while reform in-
duces risk and higher expected returns. Thus, high-productivity ﬁrms are better able to
cope with reform.
20reform.
In all our estimations we assume enterprises produce under a common
Cobb-Douglas technology.31 Though we present results for OLS and GLS
ﬁxed eﬀects estimators in the following section, we omit their discussion
here, and proceed by introducing the 2- and 3-Step OP-estimator. The
log-linear production function to be estimated is given by:
yit = β0 + βllit + βlrlrit + βllrllrit + βkkit + βararit + ωit + ηit (1)
Thus, the log of enterprise i’s value added at time t, yit, is modelled as a
function of the log of that enterprise’s state variables, capital, kit, and un-
observed productivity, ωit, and its choice variable labour, lit. We control for
reforms by introducing dummy variables for asset reform, arit, and labour
reform, lrit. Further, by introducing an interaction term of labour with the
labour reform dummy, llrit, we allow for a diﬀerent elasticity of labour once
an enterprise is labour reformed. As we shall see, we allow technology in
general to vary depending on whether it is asset market reformed. Thus,
the error structure is comprised of a stochastic component, ηit, and the ωit.
Both ωit and ηit are unobserved by the econometrician, but ωit, as a state
variable, aﬀects the ﬁrm’s choice variables. On the other hand ηit has zero
expected value given current information, and hence does not aﬀect deci-
sions.
Simultaneity means OLS estimates would provide biased estimates for
inputs if ωit is serially correlated and also correlated with inputs and the
bias should be graver for more readily adjusted inputs. On the other hand,
we assume selection to the asset reform process produces a negative bias
on the capital coeﬃcient for that group. Enterprises with a lower capital
stock are less of a risk to be let go, ceteris paribus, and hence can select
to reform when compared with ﬁrms that have a lerger capital stock and
similar realisations of ωit. If we assume that threshold productivity for en-
try to the reform process is decreasing in k, this should produce a negative
31Given the results outlined below it is clear that the diﬀerence in production technology
across asset market reformed groups is as important as are the diﬀerences in technology
across diﬀerent sectors.
21bias in the estimate of the capital coeﬃcient. Real investment, together with
enterprise-level depreciation, δt, determines next period’s capital stock. The
accumulation equation for capital is given by kt+1 = (1 − δt)kt + it.
Two-Step Procedure: We assume that investment sequences, iit, are
mainly determined by state variables such as the observable stock of physical
assets, kit, the unobservable productivity type of the company, ωit. In par-
ticular, we assume investment chases performance to some degree. However,
other than identifying its arguments, we do not impose the exact functional
form the investment function takes, it = ht(ωt,kt), and, importantly, we as-
sume this function can be inverted and diﬀerentiated, ωt = φt(it,kt). Thus,
we can rewrite (1) as the following regression equation:
yit = c + βllit + βlrlrit + βllrllrit + βararit + φt(iit,kit) + ηit (2)
where φt(·) = βkit+ht(·), which is approximated by a ﬁfth-order polynomial
in iit and kit, with a full set of interactions. This provides “clean” estimates
for all labour related parameters, βl,βlr,βllr. We can now subtract that
part of value added that is due to labour from overall value added. Thus,
we deﬁne that part of value added that is not derived from labour as ψit =
yit − βllit − βlrlrit − βllrllrit.
So we have reduced the problem at hand to the estimation of βk and
βar. This is achieved by employing a non-linear least square estimator:





t + eit (3)
Notice that at this point (Olley and Pakes 1996) invoke a Markov process
in the investment equation for identiﬁcation, which allows the productivity
realisation of last period to drive the investment decision given the other
state variable, the capital stock.32 This is provided by the fourth term on
the R.H.S. of (3), which we proxy for with a ﬁfth-order polynomial with a
32However, for econometric identiﬁcation all that is required is weak rationality.
22full set of interactions in estimates of ht, ˆ ht = ˆ φt − βkkt − βarart.33 The
reader will notice that at this stage the asset market reform is treated as
an exogenous state variable. We include time and industry dummies in our
regressions and the above may be re-written to allow for intercept shifts for
each year and industries.
Three-Step Procedure: The estimation of the return to labour in the
production function above can be extended to control for selection bias, the
probability, ρit, of being in a reformed state, arit = 1, is modelled given the
ﬁrm’s productivity and a set of other characteristics, χit:
Pr{arit = 1|ωit, ¯ ω(kit),χit} = ρit(iit,kit,χit) (4)
To generate unbiased estimates of βl, a partially linear equation in a semi-
parametric regression model allowing for both selection and simultaneity
bias, one can proxy for φt(·) with a third order polynomial in iit,kit and ρit.
This can be run on sub-samples of enterprises in reformed and unreformed
states to allow all for the possibility that the elasticity with respect to labour
may change when the enterprise has autonomy over factors, arit = 1, and in
addition the parameters of the third order polynomial in iit and kit and can
be diﬀerent. In step 3, to distinguish the eﬀect of capital on the investment
and selection decision from that on output, we estimate βk using a non-linear
least square estimator:








it + eit (5)
We proxy the fourth term on the R.H.S. of the equation with a third-order
polynomial in estimates of ht and ρit (reform probability), where the es-
timate of ht(ωit,kit) = φt(iit,kit) − β0 − βkkit − βararit.34 As above, we
33Our OP two-step procedure estimates of the parameters of the production function
are stable from a polynomial of order three on.
34The careful reader will note that the polynomial was of order ﬁve in the two-step
procedure. We face a trade-oﬀ here: The number of terms required increases exponentially
23point out that (Olley and Pakes 1996) assume that ωit follows a Markov
process, which allows one to use a one-period lag in the non-linear structure
for ωit. We argue that weak rationality suﬃces for empirical identiﬁca-
tion. Again, this can be estimated in sub-samples of asset market reformed
and unreformed enterprises, which allows for diﬀerent β’s in reformed and
unreformed samples. We also include time and industry dummies in our
regressions and the above may be re-written to allow for intercept shifts for
each year and sub-industries.
4 Results
In this section we summarise the empirical results. The main results are the
estimates of production function parameters, see Table 4, and ﬁrm-level pro-
ductivity, see Table 5. We use various estimators, OLS, GLS within group,
and OP 2-Step, which controls for simultaneity, and OP 3-Step, which also
controls for selection bias. Given the evidence below, the OP 3-Step estima-
tor appears to be the most pertinent one to use in this context. Further, we
run these estimators using the entire sample, but we also split the sample
according to whether asset control was devolved to the managerial level or
not.35 All the while we control for eﬀects related to labour market reforms.
For robustness, we provide evidence that investment is indeed correlated
with our productivity estimates, see Table 6.36 Further, we note that the
probability of asset market reform does depend positively on productivity,
time and previous reform steps, while it depends negatively on capital, see
Table 7.
The main results can be summarised in three statements. First, there
appears to be a two-way causality between asset market reform and produc-
tivity: Enterprises that have higher productivity are more likely to engage in
in the order of the polynomial. Since the production function parameter estimates in the
OP two-step estimator are stable from a polynomial of order three on, an asymptotic
argument should do much to quell any discomfort arising from this simpliﬁcation.
35Strictly speaking we only present split-sample results for the OP estimators.
36This is merely a crude measure, as our productivity instrument is actually a non-linear
function i and k.
24asset market reform, yet this reform process in itself increases productivity.
The results indicate about half of the estimated superior performance in the
asset market reformed sample is due to the selection issue, the remainder
may be attributed to institutional change, i.e. the reform process. This
can be seen from the fact that the productivity estimate increase induced
by splitting the samples is tempered by 50% once one controls for selection
bias. Second, the production technology of enterprises that have achieved
managerial control over enterprise assets is more capital intensive compared
to those that have not. This diﬀerence in estimates of production function
technology further increases once selection is taken into account. In general,
however, the OP estimates of production function parameters move in the
expected direction when compared to the OLS estimates, i.e. there is a drop
in the labour coeﬃcient and a rise in the capital coeﬃcient. Finally, the ef-
fect of either reform, but in particular the capital market reform, largely
appears to be captured by the OP 3-Step estimator applied to the split
sample.
The production function parameter estimates are given in Table 4 in
columns numbered (1)–(8). The results of the OLS regression utilising the
full sample are summarised in column (1). At a ﬁrst glace they reveal labour
intensive technology and also seem to imply the most signiﬁcant reform is
labour market related, which is associated with enterprises with low value
added . Once this reform is implemented, however, labour productivity ap-
pears to increase. The asset market reform seems to be associated with
larger value added ﬁrms, but is much smaller in degree when compared to
labour market reform. Speciﬁcally, the labour coeﬃcient of 0.59 is rela-
tively large and the capital coeﬃcient of 0.35 relatively small. At the same
time, the coeﬃcient on the dummy variable related to asset market reform
is positive, 0.11, while that for labour market reform is negative, -0.66. The
coeﬃcient on a variable resulting from an interaction of labour with the
labour market reform dummy variable is positive, 0.08. All of the reported
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 99% level.
The GLS within eﬀects estimates are somewhat troublesome, as the
labour coeﬃcient rises to 0.89 while the capital coeﬃcient is only 0.19. This,
25however, is not unexpected, as the fact that a ﬁrm’s capital stock is typically
relatively stagnant over time when compared to its labour, i.e. there is little
within variation. Furthermore, since there is heterogeneity in capital stock
between ﬁrms, much of the capital eﬀect is likely to be picked-up by the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercept, i.e. the ﬁxed eﬀect.37 Also, the time-varying reform
dummy variables become insigniﬁcant or change their sign, which is diﬃcult
to interpret. Thus, the GLS within group estimator does not appear to be
ideal in these conditions.
The results of the OP 2-Step estimator are listed in columns (3)–(5) and
those of the OP 3-Step estimator are listed in columns (6)–(8). In columns
(3) & (6) we present results for the entire sample, while (4) & (7) represent
those for the non asset market reformed sub-sample and (5) & (8) those
for the asset market reformed sub-sample. The main points to take away
from these regressions are the following. Taking the OLS regressions and
the expected biases thereof, the Olley and Pakes generated estimates tend
to move in the right direction, and this correct movement is accentuated
for the reformed sub-sample.38 In particular, we have an increase in the
capital coeﬃcient and a reduction in the labour coeﬃcient, irrespective of
reform status. Furthermore, while the sign of the reform related variables
mirror those of OLS, there are some changes regarding size and signiﬁcance.
Consistent with our reasoning for employing this methodology, the selection
procedure appears to take up most of the reform eﬀects, especially those
related to asset market reform. Also, once the samples are split, the labour
market reform only retains signiﬁcance for the non-asset market reformed
sub-sample.
While the labour coeﬃcient in the OP 2-Step remains close to the OLS
estimates for the whole sample and the non-asset market reformers, it falls
signiﬁcantly, to 0.46, for the reformed sub-sample, see column (5). This
remains so in the OP 3-Step estimator case, see columns (6)–(8). As for
the capital coeﬃcient, compared to OLS it rises by at least 20% for the OP
37See (Olley and Pakes 1996) & (Grilliches and Mairesse 1995)
38Right & Correct in the sense that, compared to OLS, the coeﬃcients move in the
expected direction given the perceived biases of the estmiates. See (Olley and Pakes 1996).
26estimators across the board. It is up to 30% higher for the asset market re-
formed sub-sample in the OP 2-Step, and 50% higher once selection eﬀects
are included in the 3-Step procedure. These changes in the capital coeﬃ-
cients are precisely what we would expect to see. Thus, the labour intensity
of the non-reformers is somewhat tempered compared to OLS estimates,
while the asset market reformed enterprises must now be labeled capital
intensive. Regarding the impact of the reforms: Compared to OLS, the es-
timated impact of asset reform rises signiﬁcantly in the OP 2-Step when the
whole sample is included. Once the 3-Step procedure corrects for selection,
however, the coeﬃcient is below that estimated by OLS and barely signiﬁ-
cant, see column (6). For the 2-Step procedure, see columns (3)–(5), labour
market reform matches the OLS estimates, though the impact is larger for
the non-asset market reformed sub-sample. Though the labour market re-
form related variable coeﬃcients remain signiﬁcant in the OP 3-Step for the
whole sample and the non-asset market reformed sub-sample, their coeﬃ-
cients have shrunk drastically, see columns (6) & (7). For the asset reformed
sub-sample labour market reforms are not signiﬁcant, see column (8).
The average productivity estimates from the OP estimator regressions
from columns(3)–(8) of Table 4 are listed in Table 5 by year and asset reform
sub-sample. The results suggest that asset market reformed enterprises are
more productive. Half of this estimated diﬀerence, however, stems from se-
lection, while merely the remainder may actually be attributed to improved
performance. On inspection, it is immediately clear that average productiv-
ity of the asset reformed enterprises is larger than that of the non-reformers.
Furthermore, this diﬀerence is most drastic when the samples are split but
selection problems are not taken into account. The three-step procedure,
however, tempers this eﬀect. The productivity estimates of the unreformed
enterprises remain relatively static as we change speciﬁcations. One may
note that splitting the samples but not accounting for selection implies the
reformed sub-sample have an average estimated productivity three times as
large as the non-reformers. Once selection is taken into account by using the
three-step procedure the productivity estimates of the reformers appears to
be only twice as large when compared to the non-reformers. Finally, the ap-
27parent lack of productivity improvement over time can be partly due to the
fact that more productive enterprises select into the asset reformed group,
thus dragging the average of both groups down.
There are two further points to make that may allay some speciﬁc doubts
about the pertinence of this methodology to the matter at hand. Firstly,
is investment at all suitable as an instrument for productivity in Chinese
SOEs? And, secondly, does the propensity to undergo asset market reform
depend signiﬁcantly on productivity realisations for a given capital stocl,
i.e. do we have a selection problem at all? Table 6 shows that there does
exist a positive (linear) correlation of about 0.1 among investment and pro-
ductivity estimates, and that the correlation is consistently larger for the
asset reformed group. This fact lends some support to our argument that
investment is weakly related to productivity, though this does not include
non-linearity and the other state variable, i.e. capital. Regressions (9) &
(10) show the results of probit regressions with asset market and labour
market reform dummies as dependent variables, respectively. The fact that
in regression (9) capital and productivity, on top of a time trend and indus-
try and location dummies, are signiﬁcant implies that it is likely a selection
problem exists. On the other hand, regression (10) shows that the labour
market reform depends negatively on capital, positively on labour, and is
independent of productivity, which implies a diﬀerent selection process is
likely to be involved here. The time-trend has a similar impact compared to
asset market reform, which indicates that, though selection depended on en-
terprise characteristics, there as a general move for asset market and labour
market reform.
Summing up our results we note the following. During the late 1980s
and early 1990s asset market reform was most likely to be introduced in
SOEs that exhibited higher productivity and this institutional change ac-
tually resulted in improved performance. Also, the asset market reformed
enterprises exhibit higher levels of capital intensity in their production tech-
nology when compared to the non-reformed enterprises. The OP 3-Step
estimator appears to be well employed in this scenario for several reasons.
Irrespective of asset market reform status, investment seems to be related to
28productivity, i.e. it appears to be a good proxy for productivity, while there
also appears to be a selection issue. In particular, the smaller the capital
stock the lower appears to be the productivity level required to select to
the reformed group. This exactly mirrors the selection problem discussed
in (Olley and Pakes 1996). Actually, (Olley and Pakes 1996) discuss sur-
vival bias, but a key innovation of this paper is to apply these insights to
sample selection problems. Finally, Chinese SOEs’ productivity and capital
intensity increased over this time-period.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we provide empirical and methodological contribution. Em-
pirically, we describe and evaluate the eﬀect of a particular set of reforms,
namely the eﬀect of introducing factor market competition, prior to pri-
vatisation. We do this using a unique balanced panel of 680 State-Owned
Enterprises in the industrial sector of China during 1980 to 1994. Method-
ologically, we provide an adaptation of an algorithm outlined by (Olley and
Pakes 1996) with which we estimate productivity dynamics allowing for si-
multaneity and selection bias. Selection bias is an issue as observable and
unobservable enterprise characteristics, chieﬂy capital intensity, size, and
productivity, co-determine the likelihood of being reformed at a particular
point in time.
We draw the following conclusions from our analysis. Factor market re-
forms were introduced in a tentative and experimental fashion. By the late
eighties and early nineties a broad push was made to include over eighty
percent of enterprises. Throughout the bulk of this period smaller, more
productive enterprises were more likely to be selected for capital market
reform, while those with large labour force and low productivity appear to
have been selected for labour market reform only. As for the eﬀect of re-
forms, we note that enterprises selected into the group that has managerial
control over enterprise assets have higher productivity levels and are more
capital intensive to begin with. Further, the diﬀerence in our estimates be-
comes starker once we allow for diﬀerences in technology, the relationship
29between investment and productivity, or control for selection bias between
those that have asset control and those that do not. Also, the relationship
between investment and our productivity estimate productivity is stronger
for this group. Interestingly, and insightfully, while we only actively attempt
to deal with the problem of selection bias for the group that has control over
enterprise assets, the measure we take captures to a very large extent the
eﬀect of labour market reforms. Hence we conclude that the reform pro-
cess is linked to productivity in a way that suggests the causality runs in
both directions: Enterprises with control over assets were better to begin
with, and improved their performance once they reformed. Once this ef-
fect is accounted for, we measure no further impact attributable to labour
market reform. On the other hand, for those that did not gain autonomy
over enterprise assets, the ones that gained the right to hire and ﬁre employ-
ees improved their labour productivity. However, these enterprises exhibit
lower levels of value added. Enterprises without managerial control over
assets remained with lower total factor productivity throughout the sample
period, even when correcting for selection bias. Finally, these results hold
pre-privatisation. This is important, as it shows that incomplete reforms
in terms of changing the economic structure from plan to market can be
eﬀective on the margin so long as incentives are aligned.
30Tables
Table 1: Number of Enterprises by Reform Category & Year
Labour
Year No Reform Labour Asset and
Asset
81 679 0 2 0
82 679 0 2 0
83 675 0 5 1
84 668 0 8 5
85 657 0 17 7
86 642 4 27 8
87 611 18 39 13
88 534 41 79 27
89 457 64 98 62
90 290 50 143 198
91 195 50 174 262
92 128 32 183 338
93 65 20 159 437
Note: This table lists by year the number of enterprises that have undertaken no
factor market reform, only labour market, only capital market, or both types of
reform.
31Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample, and Sub-Samples
Asset Asset
Whole Sample Unreformed Reformed
Mean 2221.6 1913.6 2991.8
Value Added Standard Deviation 7364.6 5925.1 10063.2
Observations 8424 6017 2407
Mean 1850.1 1827.1 1907.6
Labour Standard Deviation 3480.4 3555.3 3285.8
Observations 9014 6437 2577
Mean 2419.1 2167.3 3054.9
Capital Standard Deviation 8741.2 7664.7 10976.2
Observations 8340 5974 2366
Mean 398.9 375.1 476.2
Investment Standard Deviation 2980.6 2824.1 3439.8
Observations 8344 6379 1965
Mean 0.28 0.0 1.0
Asset Reform Standard Deviation 0.45 0.0 0.0
Observations 9144 6562 2582
Note: This table presents the summary statistics for key variables. They are re-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 6: Correlation Coeﬃcients Among Investment and Two- and Three-
Step Olley-Pakes Productivity Estimates
Corr(Iit,ωit) Sample No Asset Reform Asset Reform
OP 2-Step All 0.09 0.11
OP 2-Step Split 0.06 0.14
OP 3-Step All 0.07 0.10
OP 3-Step Split 0.06 0.11
Note: This table reports the correlation coeﬃcients between investment and pro-
ductivity estimates. The productivity estimates are generated using diﬀerent sam-
ples, the full sample, and asset control reformed and unreformed subsamples, and
diﬀerent estimation methods, notably OP 2- and 3-step.
36Table 7: Probit Regressions with (9) Capital Reform and (10) Labour













Industry and Yes Yes
Location Dummies
Third Order No No
Polynomial
Observations 6411 6391
Pseudo R-Square 0.55 0.53
Log Likelihood -1631.79 -1435.94
Likelihood Ratio 4057.12 3227.5
(Chi-square d.f.) (51) (50)
Note: This table lists the coeﬃcients of probit regressions. Reform status is re-
gressed on various company characteristics. The estimates’ standard errors are
reported in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels are ﬂagged by conventional star ratings:
*** is 99%, ** is 98%, and * is 95% level signiﬁcance.
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38Figure 3: Distribution of the Logarithm of OP 3-Step Productivity Esti-
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Figure 4: Distribution of the Logarithm of OP 3-Step Productivity Esti-
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